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Abstract   
India perceives the entire Indian Ocean region (IOR) as its 
strategic backyard and regards itself as a “security 
provider” in the region. This view, of course, is not shared 
by many, mainly by the Chinese who often state “the 
Indian Ocean is not India‟s backyard.” To reinforce its 
own perceptions and stem its eroding influence in the 
region - India has stepped up its efforts in enhancing its 
relations in general and on maritime security in particular 
with its island neighbours, an aspect that is being 
extended to the entire South Asian neighbourhood 
incrementally. The importance of the Mahanian concept 
of utilising Sea Power for the achievement of national 
objectives has led to the realisation amongst a normally 
„sea blind‟ Indian bureaucracy to become more proactive. 
This article explores the maritime policy of India with 
regard to its neighbouring littoral states in the Indian 
Ocean. 
Keywords: Maritime Security, Trilateralism, Indian Ocean Region, India, 
Maritime Domain Awareness, Defence Cooperation. 
Introduction 
India perceives the entire Indian Ocean region (IOR) as its strategic 
backyard and regards itself as a “security provider” in the region. 
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This view, of course, is not shared by many, mainly by the Chinese 
who often state “the Indian Ocean is not India‟s backyard.” They 
underline the fact that they too have deep interests in the region 
and have been active since they sent their first anti-piracy patrol to 
the Gulf of Aden to fight against Somalian piracy in 2008 as part of 
the concept of MOOTW (Military Operations other than War). 
To reinforce its own perceptions and stem its eroding influence in 
the region - India has stepped up its efforts in enhancing its 
relations in general and on maritime security in particular with its 
island neighbours, an aspect that is being extended to the entire 
South Asian neighbourhood incrementally. Indeed, it is a process 
that began some time ago and was essentially pursued by the 
respective National Security Advisors of the countries which led to 
the signing of the Trilateral Maritime Security Cooperation 
Agreement by India, Sri Lanka and the Maldives in July 
2013.However, undoubtedly the entire effort received an impetus 
with the March 2015 visit of the Indian Prime Minister Narendra 
Modi to three island nations, Sri Lanka,Seychelles and Mauritius. A 
visit to Maldives during the same tour was deliberately avoided in 
response to the volatile internal politics of the country, which had 
convicted the India backed former President Mohamed Nasheed 
with a thirteen-year prison sentence.  
Most analysts and media while dissecting the rationale of the PM‟s  
tour  tended to project  it as a part of a focused effort at veering the 
hostcountries away from the growing Chinese influence in the 
region, but in reality it only represented  a part of the larger picture 
as it carried forward the agenda that had been set in motion earlier 
by the help of the previous national security advisors (NSA) 
meetings. With this in the background it would be difficult to 
evaluate if the visit succeeded in stemming India‟s eroding 
influence or did it successfully see a reduction in the evolving 
Chinese “hold” over the countries.    
However, the visit did manage to signal India‟s readiness to 
assume greater responsibility and overt leadership of the region, in 
a departure from its earlier ambiguous posture when India was 
reluctant to assume strategic leadership of the region despite being 
exhorted by the US to do so. Earlier, India had refused to play the 
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role of a regional “headmaster” and preferred to work from the 
sidelines without much fanfare.   
India had long harboured great power aspirations as a balance of 
power but paradoxically had always refused to take additional 
responsibility and assume overt leadership in a deeply contested 
region. Thus, this new post signified a strategic transitioning of 
sorts. This process of change commenced with India initiating the 
Indian Ocean Naval Symposium(IONS) maritime initiative wherein 
it played the role of an “unobtrusive fulcrum”. Hence, the overt 
manifestations were much more in evidence in the current case of 
“maritime security trilateral” highlighted during the Modi visit. 
At the heart of this new posturing is the Indian desire to build 
amultilateral maritime arrangement with Sri Lanka, Seychelles, 
Mauritius and Maldives. “We call this Indian Ocean outreach as 
„SAGAR‟ said Prime Minister Modi in Mauritius during his visit. 
At another occasion, the Foreign Minister added:“We seek a future 
for Indian Ocean that lives up to the name of SAGAR- Security and 
Growth for All in the Region.”However, it is noteworthy that - 
India, Sri Lanka and Maldives have not been comfortable with the 
concept of a security alliance either in substance or in terms and 
hence have avoided the same amongst themselves or with others. 
Interestingly none joined the earlier security constructs like the 
Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) or Central Treaty 
Organisation (CENTO). Hence, the coming together of these 
nations on a security related platform signifies the evolving 
geopolitics of the region and the national priorities of the countries 
involved.  
The NSA level Meetings earlier hadn‟t involved all the islands 
together, and the main agenda was simply to create a closer 
functional operative only on maritime security within the given 
three islands (to be later expanded to other islands as well). Given 
that all the islands in the region lacked maritime capacity, India 
stepped in to promise in assisting in the capacity build-up. Thus, 
the focus essentially was to bring these countries to a common grid   
of a multilateral maritime security framework, reiterating India‟s 
new policy of „neighbours first.‟ 
Artha J Soc Sci                                                                               ISSN 0975-329X 
4 
 
Factors contributing to Maritime Security Trilateral 
There were many factors which contributed to the formation of the 
trilateral network. The primary one which provided the impetus 
was the maritime challenges faced by the countries were similar if 
not identical. Asymmetric threats such as maritime terrorism, arms 
and drug trade, piracy, human and weapons smuggling, were 
essentially transnational in characteristics requiring multinational 
response strategies – which made it incumbent on India with its 
large maritime capacity to provide the lead as well as help in 
building them maritime capacity of its friendly neighbours. 
Apart from such threats, the necessity of maintaining an advanced 
level of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) as part of the overall 
response strategy was another aspect which led to the focus on the 
sharing of technical aspects of MDA. IOR being the hub of many 
natural calamities – the brunt of which had often been faced by the 
littorals, it was inevitable that disaster management and 
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) become a 
factor that brought the countries together. With Indian forces 
providing yeoman services during the Tsunami of 2004 – it was 
natural for India to assume leadership in this regard.  
Apart from the above, the dire need to ensure Sea Lanes of 
Communication (SLOC) security and unhindered passage of 
maritime trade was another aspect that helped in coming together 
of the countries since all the littorals were deeply dependent on 
maritime trade for their economic well-being. Similarly, the 
increasing role of China in fostering its bilateral relations with the 
island neighbours was one of the most important factors 
strategically to initiate this movement. The Indians perceive such 
moves by China in their strategic backyard as being inimical to 
their interests. The numerous construction projects of ports, 
infrastructure and base facilities in the IOR by China is a matter of 
great concern for India as it diminishes its strategic leverages. The 
construction of Hambantota port in Sri Lanka with Chinese money 
and material and anchoring of Ming class diesel submarine at a 
private dock in Colombo port, built, controlled and run by a 
Chinese company, the China Merchants Holdings (International) 
within the Sri Lankan administered harbour, is a case in point. It is 
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probably for this reason that New Delhi is apprehensive about 
China‟s “Maritime Silk Route” concept. 
India’s security relations with Sri Lanka  
The Indian Prime Minter‟s visit to Sri Lanka held deep significance 
as it was the first one in 28 years and it occurred at a time when 
China‟s growing presence in Sri Lanka had suffered a setback with 
the defeat of Mahinda Rajapaksa. Earlier, a considerable amount of 
heartburn had resulted from Rajapaksha‟s perceptible tilt towards 
China. A series of incidents had convinced the Indian Government 
that it needed serious discussion with the Sri Lankans on the issue 
as the repeated docking of Chinese submarines at the harbour had 
caused serious security concerns for India.  Fortunately for India, a 
subsequent change in government brought respite and the new 
Sirisena government has made its desire publicly to correct the 
earlier tilt towards China and has already made some significant 
overtures towards India. The new President has visited India as his 
first trip abroad which resulted in a civil nuclear energy 
cooperation pact between India and Sri Lanka. In a move that risks 
adiplomatic row with its largest trading partner, Sri Lanka 
has suspended a $1.4 billion Chinese luxury real estate project in 
Colombo.1 
Having overcome the baggage of history, it needs to be 
mentionedthat the two armed forces of India and Sri Lanka support 
a close service to service relationship. Training exchanges at 
differing levels of seniority have been common and continue to be 
popularly subscribed.  Military intelligence sharing had continued 
since earlier times when on several occasions such information 
helped the Sri Lankan Navy to intercept arms shipments to the 
LTTE successfully.  
However, paradoxically despite the close Defence cooperation 
between the countries, one of the biggest unfinished agendas has 
been the absence of a formal Defence Cooperation Agreement 
(DCA) even though it has been in discussion since 2003. Domestic 
compulsions on either side have prevented the final signing of the 
DCA. The encouraging aspect, however, has been that the lack of a 
formal defence agreement has not been a real constraining factor in 
enhancing the level of defence cooperation between the two 
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countries.  For example, despite a political controversy that erupted 
in Tamil Nadu in 2013, India continues to train Sri Lankan 
personnel and officers.  Additionally, New Delhi and Colombo had 
also commenced a formal Annual Defence Dialogue (ADD) in 
February 2012.    
In the field of equipment transfers, even though India has 
steadfastly maintained its public posturing about not supplying 
offensive military hardware to Sri Lanka, it has quietly decided to 
extend a 100 million dollars credit line for purchase of non-lethal 
weapons. In fact, since 2000, India has supplied 24 L-70 anti-aircraft 
guns, 11 USFM radars, 10 Mine Protected Vehicles and 24 
Battlefield Surveillance Radars to Sri Lanka. 
India’s Security Relations with Maldives  
India and Maldives both have developed close strategic, military, 
economic and cultural relations over the many years. The closeness 
was particularly evident when India intervened militarily at the 
request of the President of Maldives and prevented a coup in 
November 1988. Operation Cactus as it was termed was a success 
and prevented the overthrow of President Gayoom by a Maldivian 
named Abdullah Luthufi and his group assisted by  80 heavily 
armed mercenaries of the People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil 
Eelam (PLOTE).  On request from President Gayoom, the Indian 
government dispatched 1600 troops by air who finally overcame 
the mercenaries and prevented the coup. The event firmly 
established India‟s role as a security provider in the entire region as 
New Delhi‟s role was well appreciated by the international 
community.  
The reiteration that India was emerging as a security provider came 
up again whenMaldives approached New Delhi in 2009, over fears 
that one of its island resorts could be taken over by terrorists given 
its lack of military and surveillance capabilities. In the meantime, 
due to an agreement signed in 2009, the following actions had 
already been initiated  
a) India has permanently based two helicopters at Maldives 
for surveillance. One Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) 
basedin Addu Island and the other more advanced 
helicopter to be based in Hannimadhoo Island. 
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b) Maldives has coastal radars on only two of its 26 atolls. 
India  helped in setting  up radars stations in  all 26 for 
seamless coverage  
c) The coastal radar chain in Maldives will be networked with 
the Indian coastal radar system. India has already 
undertaken a project to install radars along its entire 
coastline. The radar chains are being interlinked and a 
central control room in India‟s Coastal Command.  
In addition to the above defence arrangements, the Indian Coast 
Guard (ICG) has been tasked to utilise its Dornier aircraft for 
regular surveillance sorties over the island. The aim is to have 
active airsurveillance and patrolling against the emergent threat 
from Somali pirates, and these Dornier sorties have helped in 
easing the threat perception. Besides, India-Maldives-Sri Lanka also 
held a Joint Trilateral Coast Guard exercise called DOSTI XI off the 
coast of Male (Maldives) in April 2012 which looked at areas of 
common interest and enhanced interoperability between the forces.  
Earlier NSA Meetings and its Outcome 
The process of trilateralism had actually commenced with the 
intensive staff level talks that were followed by the NSA level talks 
which provided the impetus for the initiative and in the 
development of a trilateral security partnership and the 
Agreement. The first such meeting was held in Male in October 
2011 which had preceded four separate meetings of senior officials 
between the three sides. This preparatory work by the working 
level was useful in framing the outcomes of the Second NSA-level 
Trilateral Meeting. 
 The second meeting of the NSA was hosted by Sri Lanka and held 
in Colombo in July 2013. The three participating countries agreed 
on a roadmap for cooperation in maritime security, comprising the 
following three categories of activities: 
 Initiatives to enhance Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)  
especially initiatives such as Long Range Identification and 
Tracking (LRIT) services and sharing of Automatic 
Identification System (AIS) data; 
Artha J Soc Sci                                                                               ISSN 0975-329X 
8 
 
 Training and capacity building initiatives in areas of MDA, 
Search and Rescue, and Oil Pollution Response; and 
 Joint activities including trilateral exercises, maintaining 
lines of communication on illegal maritime activities, 
formulation of marine oil pollution response contingency 
plans and cooperation in legal and policy issues related to 
piracy. 
India hosted the third NSA-level Trilateral Meeting on Maritime 
Security Cooperation between Maldives, Sri Lanka and India on 6 
March 2014 in New Delhi. The same three primary interlocutors 
who had participated in the earlier meetings did so this time. 
Accordingly, theIndian team was led by Ambassador Shivshankar 
Menon, while the Maldivian side was headed by Col (Retd) 
Mohamed Nazim, Minister of Defence (MoD) and National 
Security and Mr Gotabaya Rajapaksa, Secretary, MoD and Urban 
Development of Sri Lanka headed his country‟s delegation. The 
important aspect was that the meeting was also attended by 
Mauritius and Seychelles which implied that they too would 
become part of the grouping.  
This meeting discussed the progress of implementation of various 
activities that had been identified earlier.  They also discussed new 
areas of cooperation including hydrography; training in Visit, 
Board, Search and Seizure Operations; training on board Indian 
Sail Training Ships; exchanges between think tanks; and joint 
participation in adventure activities. Given India‟s horrific 
experience with the Mumbai blasts there was a realization that  
terrorism was a transnational crime that demanded the active 
participation of all littorals whose maritime capacity needed to be 
built as there is a dire necessity to invest in MDA – specifically 
Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) and the Automatic 
Identification System (AIS). Thus, it provided India with the 
unique opportunity to share its technological expertise with its 
allies for maritime capacity enhancement.   
The other topics of discussion included Search and Rescue (SAR). It 
was agreed that India would also provide expertise and technical 
assistance for setting up/ enhancing Maritime Rescue Coordination 
Centres (MRCCs) in Sri Lanka2 and Maldives for effective 
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coordination in relaying and receiving distress alerts and safety 
messages. Given the current focus on preventing/controlling 
maritime pollution that not only to destroys marine environment 
but has considerable security considerations- this was another topic 
for discussion. With Indian Coast Guard (INCG) and US Coast 
Guard being the few maritime agencies that were capable of 
tackling oil pollution it was decided that there be considerable 
scope for promoting marine oil pollution response cooperation 
with the appropriate agencies of these island nations. 
One of the most important issues that were discussed was the rise 
of asymmetric challenges especially terrorism and piracy in the 
region. Both these aspects scored high in the threat perception of 
the participating littorals. As a consequence, there were extensive 
discussions on the need to expand „DOSTI‟ (friendship) 
exercises3by holding table top exercises and further enhancing 
sharing of the information on illegal maritime activities through 
existing points of contact. Additionally, there was also a consensus 
on forming a trilateral sub-group which would focus exclusively on 
the complexities of policy and legal issues related to piracy. With 
India having been unable to finally pass a national legislation 
(Piracy Bill 2012) to overcome a serious hurdle in the prosecution of 
apprehended pirates - this was an issue that was significant in 
dealing with anti- piracy operations. 
These meetings chalked out the entire roadmap for future security 
cooperation outlining the following:  
a. The facility of the Indian Long Range Identification and 
Tracking (LRIT) Data Centre to be used by Sri Lanka and 
Maldives to monitor and track their merchant vessels flying 
their flags. In turn, Sri Lanka and Maldives are to provide 
required details of their merchant ships as per International 
Maritime Organisation (IMO) regulations.  
b. The Merchant Ship Information System (MSIS)  be utilised 
for exchange of unclassified information on shipping; 
c. Sharing Automatic Identification System (AIS) data in a 
trilateral format over the MSIS platform; 
d. Undertaking MDA training in India; 
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e. Strengthening maritime linkages in the field of SAR  
through operations, providing expertise and technical 
assistance to India in setting up Maritime Rescue 
Coordination Centres (MRCCs) in Sri Lanka and Maldives, 
coordination in relaying and receiving distress alerts and 
safety messages, and, conduct of SAR training in India; 
f. Strengthening mechanisms for Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) surveillance and providing additional support and 
assets on a case by case basis; 
g. Maintaining lines of communication on illegal maritime 
activities between identified Points of Contact and 
exchanging messages on a regular basis; 
h. Strengthening marine pollution response cooperation 
through conduct of IMO Level I and Level II courses in 
India, formulating contingency plans for pollution response, 
capacity building, and participating in India‟s National 
Pollution Response Exercise (NATPOLREX), as observers; 
i. Strengthening the biennial trilateral exercise „DOSTI‟ by 
conducting table top exercises and seminars on maritime 
issues in every alternate year; 
j. Passing Tsunami warnings simultaneously to agreed Points 
of Contact and also to the designated National Tsunami 
Warning Centres; 
k. Setting up a trilateral sub-group focused on legal and policy 
issues related to piracy. 
Beyond Trilateralism 
The concept of comprehensive security in modern usage has an 
accent on cooperative approaches but using and sharing of latest 
technology in capacity building is a relatively new idea within the 
IOR especially for India which was hindered by its previous 
isolationisticmindset that was prominent during the Cold War era. 
Undoubtedly, the success of getting its island neighbours within 
maritime security grid will be expanded furtherin due course of 
time – as is evident from the willingness of the other islands to 
follow suit. Given that these islands face similar maritime 
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challenges such a symbiotic arrangement seems mutually beneficial 
to all. Thus very soon Mauritius and Seychelles, which share strong 
bilateral relations with India, are most likely to join in this 
arrangement.  
Strategically, the Indians have been wary of the growing influence 
of the external powers in the region – mainly with respect to China. 
Hence at the subterranean level, this dynamic arrangement will 
partly offset the growing influence of China and Pakistan in the 
regional dynamics.  Additionally, the current arrangement will 
provide India with the option to develop forward bases in the 
entire region if the need arises. With the available technology and 
the willingness of the participating countries these bases could well 
be notional or real.  Thus, in a master stroke, it will enable India to 
retain its public posturing against military forward basing in the 
region and thus maintain moral high ground – while possessing the 
ability to assess the farthest regions with technological means 
without the overwhelming physical presence of its military troops 
in that area.  
The task is likely to be made easier since India is normally 
perceived as a benign power in the Indian Ocean, in sharp contrast 
to the perception of a hegemonic China which supports an 
intrusive way of providing aid and capacity building assistance.  
Hence, it might be easier for the littorals to readily join the 
bandwagon willingly rather than be swayed by Chinese 
inducements. Admittedly, there exists another major maritime 
security initiative known as the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium 
(IONS), initiated by India in 2008 that aims at bringing the IOR 
littoral navies together for active discussions on matters of common 
maritime interest. However, this regional forum of navies is 
decidedly naval in its outlook and can supplement a more holistic 
overview of security cooperation in the region. With a perceptible 
“cooling” of IONS ability to gather other littorals in enhancing the 
maritime dialogue- such trilateral or multilateral agreements are 
more potent and efficient in achieving their objective.  




The importance of the Mahanian concept of utilising Sea Power for 
the achievement of national objectives has led to the realisation 
amongst a normally „sea blind‟ Indian bureaucracy to become 
moreproactive.  It is now being understood that naval diplomacy 
and projection of maritime power can help India in achieving its 
objectives of being a net security provider in a region perceived to 
be its strategic backyard.  With this background, the rise of 
maritime threats from the seas and the lack of maritime capacity 
amongst many friendly littorals has resulted in a symbiotic 
relationship of sorts and resulted in India drawing close two of its 
neighbouring islands. The first step in this regard has been the 
signing of the security related Trilateral Maritime Security 
Cooperation Agreement by India, Sri Lanka and the Maldives with 
such an arrangement to be expanded to all its friendly island 
neighbours.  
Simultaneously, these efforts have helped India to stem its eroding 
influence in the region while denuding the increasing influence of 
foreign powers, mainly China in the region. Strategically India‟s 
initiative „neighbours first‟ policy that has regionally manifested 
into getting the friendly island nations on a common maritime 
security grid has strenuously reiterated India‟s position as a net 
security provider. This has also ensured that India retains strategic 
leverages against adversarial powers that have been active in 
fostering their influence in the region. However, it remains to be 
seen how far India can nourish this symbiotic relation with its 
neighbours and continue offsetting the Chinese influence in the 
years to come.      
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1 The Sri Lankan government‟s decision to review, and in effect suspend, 
the $US1.4 billion, Chinese-backed Colombo Port City (CPC) project 
strained relations between Beijing and Colombo considerably. The 
plan was to construct a modern 500-acre (230 hectare) city, with 
hotels, apartments and office buildings, on earth fill near the seafront 
of Colombo harbor. About 200 acres were to be held by China 
Communications Construction Company (CCCC), the main 
contractor, on a 99-year lease. The deal was sealed during Rajpaksha‟s 
time. Also see Fernando, M. (2015, March 16). World Socialist Web 
Site. Retrieved July 09, 2016, from https://www.wsws.org/en/ 
articles/2015/03/16/chin-m16.html 
2  India currently has three MRCCs (at Mumbai, Chennai and at Port Blair)  
in its Search and Rescue Region ( SRR)  as well as numerous Maritime 
Rescue Sub Centres (MRSC‟s) There exists an MRCC in Colombo  
3 Exercise “Dosti” (Friendship) was started as a bi-annual exercise 
between the Coast Guards of India and Maldives in 1991 with the 
objective of strengthening co-operation. In its 20th year it included 
(2012) the Sri Lankan Coast Guard. 
 
